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Abstract. Memory disclosure attacks play an important role in the
exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities. By analyzing recent
research, we observe that bypasses of defensive solutions that enforce
control-flow integrity or attempt to detect return-oriented programming
require memory disclosure attacks as a fundamental first step. However,
research lags behind in detecting such information leaks.
In this paper, we tackle this problem and present a system for fine-
grained, automated detection of memory disclosure attacks against script-
ing engines. The basic insight is as follows: scripting languages, such as
JavaScript in web browsers, are strictly sandboxed. They must not pro-
vide any insights about the memory layout in their contexts. In fact, any
such information potentially represents an ongoing memory disclosure at-
tack. Hence, to detect information leaks, our system creates a clone of the
scripting engine process with a re-randomized memory layout. The clone
is instrumented to be synchronized with the original process. Any incon-
sistency in the script contexts of both processes appears when a memory
disclosure was conducted to leak information about the memory layout.
Based on this detection approach, we have designed and implemented
Detile (detection of information leaks), a prototype for the JavaScript
engine in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 10/11 on Windows 8.0/8.1. An
empirical evaluation shows that our tool can successfully detect memory
disclosure attacks even against this proprietary software.
1 Introduction
Over the last years, many different techniques were developed to prevent attacks
that exploit spatial and temporal memory corruption vulnerabilities (see for ex-
ample the survey by Szekeres et al. [52]). As a result, modern operating systems
deploy a wide range of defense methods to impede a successful attack. For exam-
ple, Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [38] marks data as non-executable and
thus an attacker is prohibited from injecting data into a vulnerable application
that is later on interpreted as code. Furthermore, Address Space Layout Ran-
domization (ASLR) [43] randomizes the memory layout either once during the
boot process or every time a process is started. Since the attacker lacks infor-
mation about the exact memory layout, it is harder for her to predict where her
shellcode or reusable code are located.
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Besides these widely deployed techniques, many other defenses were proposed
in the literature in the last years [52]. Most notably, the enforcement of control
flow integrity (CFI) is a promising technique to prevent a whole class of memory
corruption vulnerabilities [1]. The basic idea behind CFI is to verify that each
control flow transfer leads to a valid target based on a control flow graph that
is either statically pre-computed or dynamically generated. Several implementa-
tions of CFI with different design constraints, security goals, and performance
overheads were published (e.g., [21, 65, 66]).
A general observation is that the first step in modern attacks is based on a
memory disclosure attack (also referred to as information leak): the adversary
finds a way to read a (raw) memory pointer to learn some information about
the virtual address space of the vulnerable program. Generally speaking, the
attacker can then de-randomize the address space based on this leaked pointer
(thus bypassing ASLR), use ROP to bypass DEP, and finally execute shellcode of
her choice. Modern exploits leverage information leaks as a fundamental primi-
tive. Furthermore, recent CFI and ROP defense bypasses use memory disclosures
as well. For example, Snow et al. introduced Just-In-Time Code Reuse attacks
(JIT-ROP [48]) to bypass fine-grained ASLR implementations by repeatedly
utilizing an information leak. G-Free [39], a compiler-based approach against
any ROP attack, was recently circumvented by Athanasakis et al. [3]. Their
technique requires successive information leaks to disclose enough needed infor-
mation. Go¨ktas¸ et al. demonstrated several bypasses of proposed ROP defenses
and their exploit needs an information leak as a first step [27]. An information
leak is also needed by Song et al., who showed that dynamic code generation is
vulnerable to code injection attacks [49]. Similarily, Counterfeit Object-oriented
Programming (COOP [44]) needs to disclose the location of vtables to mount a
subsequent control-flow hijacking attack by reusing them. Disclosures are also
utilized by memory oracles to weaken various defenses [24]. All of these offensive
bypasses utilized an information leak as a first step and implemented the attack
against a web browser.
Another general observation is that script engines in web browsers are com-
monly utilized by adversaries to abuse information leaks in practice. Browser
vulnerabilities are prevalent and as the yearly pwn2own competition shows, re-
searchers successfully use them to take control of the machine. Notably, most
of these attacks are based on vulnerabilities that create an information leak
utilizing the script engine.
In this paper, we take these observations into account and propose a tech-
nique for fine-grained, automated detection of memory disclosure attacks against
script engines at runtime. Our approach is based on the insight that informa-
tion leaks are leveraged by state-of-the-art exploits to learn the placement of
modules—and thereby code sections—in the virtual address space in order to
bypass ASLR. Any sandboxed script context is forbidden to contain memory
information, i.e., no script variable is allowed to provide a memory pointer. As
such, a viable approach to detect information leaks is to create a clone of the
to be protected process with a re-randomized address space layout, which is
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Table 1: Defenses and offensive approaches utilizing an information leak in browsers to
weaken or bypass the specific defense. All mentioned attacks are mitigated by Detile.
Protection flavor Defense Weakened/Bypassed by Mitigated by Detile
Address randomization Fine-grained ASLR [29] Just-In-Time Code Reuse [48]
√
RopGuard [23], Size Does Matter [27],
Code-reuse protection KBouncer [41], Anti-ROP Evaluation [45],
√
ROPecker [12] COOP [44]
Code-reuse protection G-Free [39] Browser JIT Defense Bypass [3],
√
COOP [44]
Coarse-grained CFI CCFIR [65], Stitching the Gadgets [18],
BinCFI [66] Out of Control [26],
√
COOP [44]
Fine-grained CFI IFCC [53], Losing Control [13]
√
VTV [53]
Vtable disclosure [19],
Information-hiding Oxymoron [4] Crash-Resistance [24]
√
COOP [44]
Information-hiding CPI linear region [33] Crash-Resistance [24]
√
Execution randomization Isomeron [19] Crash-Resistance [24]
√
Randomization/Information-hiding Readactor [15] Crash-Resistance [24],
√
COOP [44]
instrumented to be synchronized with the original process. An inconsistency in
the script contexts of both processes can only occur when a memory disclosure
vulnerability was exploited to gain information about the memory layout. In
such a case, the two processes can be halted to prevent further execution of the
malicious script. An overview of bypassed defenses by specific attacks which are
mitigated by our approach is shown in Table 1.
We have implemented a prototype of our technique in a tool called Detile
(detection of information leaks). We extended Internet Explorer 10/11 (IE) on
Windows 8.0/8.1 to create a synchronized clone of each tab and enforce the infor-
mation leak checks. We chose this software mainly due to two reasons. First, IE is
an attractive target for attackers as the large number of vulnerabilities indicates.
Second, IE and Windows pose several interesting technical challenges since it is
a proprietary binary system that we need to instrument and it lacks fine-grained
ASLR. Evaluation results show that our prototype is able to re-randomize sin-
gle processes without significant computational impact. Additionally, running
IE with our re-randomization and information leak detection engine imposes a
performance hit of ∼17% on average. Furthermore, empirical tests with real-
world exploits also indicate that our approach is usable to unravel modern and
unknown exploits which target browsers and utilize memory disclosures.
In summary, our main contributions in this paper are:
– We present a system to tackle the problem of information leaks, which are
frequently used in practice by attackers as an exploit primitive. More specif-
ically, we propose a concept for fine-grained, automated detection of infor-
mation leaks with per process re-randomization, dual process execution, and
process synchronization. An extended version of this paper with more tech-
nical details is available as a technical report [25].
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– We show that dual execution of highly complex, binary-only software such as
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer is possible without access to the source code,
whereby two executing instances operate deterministic to each other.
– We implemented a prototype for IE 10/11 onWindows 8.0/8.1.We show that
our tool can successfully detect several real-world exploits, while producing
no alerts on highly complex, real-world websites.
2 Technical Background
In the following, we briefly introduce several concepts needed to understand the
challenges we were confronted with when developing Detile.
2.1 N-Variant Systems
N-Variant or Multi-Execution systems evolved from fault-tolerant environments
to mitigation systems against security critical vulnerabilities [9, 14, 30, 54]. Our
concept of Detile incorporates similar ideas like dual process execution and
dual process synchronization. However, our approach is constructed specifically
for scripting engines, and thus, is more fine-grained: While Detile operates and
synchronizes processes on the scripting interpreter’s bytecode level, n-variant sys-
tems intercept only at the system call level. One drawback for these conventional
systems is that they are prone to Just-In-Time Code-Reuse (JIT-ROP [48]) and
Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP [44]) attacks, while Detile
is able to detect these (see Sections 3.1 and 6 and for details).
2.2 Windows ASLR Internals
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a well-known security mech-
anism that involves the randomization of stacks, heaps, and loaded images in
the virtual address space. Its purpose is to leave an attacker with no knowl-
edge about the virtual memory space in which code and data lives. Combined
with DEP, ASLR makes remote system exploitation through memory corruption
techniques a much harder task. While brute-force attacks against services that
automatically restart are possible [6], such attacks are typically not viable in
practice against web browsers.
In Windows, whenever an image is loaded into the virtual address space, a
section object is created, which represents a section of memory. These objects
are managed system-wide and can be shared among all processes. Once a DLL is
loaded, its section object remains permanent as long as processes are referencing
it. This concept has the benefit that relocation takes place once and whenever
a process needs to load a DLL, its section object is reused and the view of
the section is mapped into the virtual address space of the process, making the
memory section visible. This way, physical memory is shared among all processes
that load a specific DLL whose section object is already present. In particular,
as long as the virtual address is not occupied, each image is loaded at the same
virtual address among all running usermode processes.
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2.3 WOW64 Subsystem Overview
64-bit operating systems are the systems of choice for today’s users: 64-bit pro-
cessors are widely used in practice, and hence Microsoft Windows 7 and later
versions are usually running in the 64-bit version on typical desktop systems.
However, most third-party applications are distributed in their 32-bit form. This
is for example the case for Mozilla Firefox, and also for parts of Microsoft’s Inter-
net Explorer. As our framework should protect against widely attacked targets,
it needs to support 32-bit and 64-bit processes. Therefore, theWindows On Win-
dows 64 (shortened as WOW64 ) emulation layer plays an important role, as it
allows legacy 32-bit applications to run on modern 64-bit Windows systems.
Executing a user-mode 32-bit application instructs the kernel to create a
WOW64 process. According to our observations, it creates the program’s ad-
dress space and maps the 64-bit and 32-bit NT Layer DLL (ntdll.dll) and the
main executable into it. Even when a program may have been started in sus-
pended mode, these three modules are already available. Afterwards, WOW64
layer DLLs are mapped, which mediate several necessary transitions between
64-bit and 32-bit at runtime [43]. Subsequent 32-bit DLLs are mapped into
the address space via LdrLoadDll of the 32-bit ntdll.dll. The first of them is
kernel32.dll. The loader assures that it is mapped to the same address in each
WOW64 process system wide, using a unique address per reboot. It therefore
compares its name to the hardcoded “KERNEL32.DLL” string in ntdll.dll
upon loading. If the loader is not able to map it to its preferred base address,
process initialization fails with a conflicting address error. As process based re-
randomization plays a crucial role in our framework, this issue is handled such
that each process contains its kernel32.dll at a different base address (see
Section 4.1). After mapping kernel32.dll, all other needed 32-bit DLLs are
mapped into the address space.
2.4 Internet Explorer Architecture
IE is developed as multi-process application [64]. That means, a 64-bit main
frame process governs several 32-bit WOW64 tab processes, which are isolated
from each other. The frame process runs with a medium integrity level and
isolated tab processes run with low integrity levels. Hence, tab processes are
restricted and forbidden to access all resources of processes with higher integrity
levels [37]. This architecture implies that websites opened in new tabs can lead to
the start of new tab processes. These have to incorporate our protection in order
to protect IE as complete application against information leaks (see Section 4).
2.5 Scripting Engines
In the context of IE, mainly two scripting engines are relevant and we briefly
introduce both.
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Internet Explorer Chakra. With the release of Internet Explorer 9, a new Java-
Script engine called Chakra was introduced. Since Internet Explorer 11, Chakra
exports a documented API which enables developers to embed the engine into
their own applications. However, IE still uses the undocumented internal COM
interface. Nevertheless, some Chakra internals were learned from the official
API. The engine supports just-in-time (JIT) compiling of JavaScript bytecode
to speed up execution. Typed arrays like integer arrays are stored as native ar-
rays in heap memory along with metadata to accelerate element access. Script
code is translated to JS bytecode on demand in a function-wise manner to min-
imize memory footprint and avoid generating unused bytecode. The bytecode is
interpreted within a loop, whereby undocumented opcodes govern the execution
of native functions within a switch statement. Dependent on the opcode, the
desired JavaScript functionality is achieved with native code.
ActionScript Virtual Machine (AVM). The Adobe Flash plugin for browsers and
especially for IE is a widely attacked target. Scripts written in ActionScript are
interpreted or JIT-compiled to native code by the AVM. There is much unofficial
documentation about its internals [7, 34]. Most importantly, it is possible to
intercept each ActionScript method with available tools [28]. Thus, no matter
whether bytecode is interpreted by the opcode handlers or JIT code is executed,
we are able to instrument the AVM.
2.6 Adversarial Capabilities
Memory disclosure attacks are an increasingly used technique for the exploita-
tion of software vulnerabilities [47, 48, 51]. In the presence of full ASLR, DEP,
CFI, or ROP defenses, the attacker has no anchor to a memory address to jump
to, even if in control of the instruction pointer. This is the moment where infor-
mation leaks come into play: an attacker needs to read—in any way possible—a
raw memory pointer in order to gain a foothold into the native virtual address
space of the vulnerable program. As soon as the attacker can read process mem-
ory, she can learn the base addresses of loaded modules. Then, any code reuse
primitives can be conducted to exploit a vulnerability in order to bypass DEP,
ASLR, CFI [18] and ROP defenses [11, 27]. Another possibility is to leak code
directly in order to initiate an attack and bypass ASLR [48]. Other mitigations
like Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) [36] cannot
withstand capabilities of sophisticated attackers.
For applications with scripting capabilities, untrusted contexts are sandboxed
(e.g., JavaScript in web browsers) and must not provide memory information.
Thus, attackers use different vulnerabilities to leak memory information into that
context [26,47,58]. We assume that the program we want to protect suffers from
such a memory corruption vulnerability that allows the adversary to corrupt
memory objects. In fact, a study shows that any type of memory error can
be transformed into an information leak [52]. Furthermore, we assume that the
attacker uses a scripting environment to leverage the obtained memory disclosure
information at runtime for her malicious computations. This is consistent with
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modern exploits in academic research [11,18,26,27,45] as well as in-the-wild [46,
55,58–60]. Our goal is to protect script engines against such powerful, yet realistic
adversaries.
3 System Overview
In the following, we explain our approach to tackle the challenge of detecting
information leaks in script engines. Hence, we introduce the needed building
blocks, namely per process re-randomization and dual process execution.
3.1 Main Concept
As described above, information leaks manifest themselves in the form of memory
information inside a context which must not reveal such insights. In our case, this
is any script context inside an application: high-level variables and content in a
script must not contain memory pointers, which attackers could use to deduce
image base addresses of loaded modules.
Unfortunately, a legitimate number and a memory pointer in data bytes re-
ceived via a scripting function are indistinguishable. This leads us to the follow-
ing assumption: a memory disclosure attack yields a memory pointer, which may
be surrounded by legitimate data. The same targeted memory disclosure, when
applied to a differently randomized, but otherwise identical process, will yield
the same legitimate data, but a different memory pointer. Due to the varying
base addresses of modules, different heap and stack addresses, a memory pointer
will have a different address in the second process than in the first process.
Thus, a master process and a cloned twin process—with different address space
layout randomization—can be executed synchronized side-by-side and perform
identical operations, e.g., execute a specific JavaScript function. In benign cases,
the same data getting into the script context is equal for both processes. When
comparing the received data of one process to the same data received in the
second process, the only difference can arise because of a leaked memory pointer
pointing to equal memory, but having a different address. In order to compare
the data of the master and twin process, we have to instrument the interpreter
loop of the script engine. We can instrument the call and return bytecodes to
precisely check all outgoing data and therefore to detect an information leak.
Based on this principle, our prototype system launches the same script en-
gine process twice with diverse memory layouts (see also Figure 1). The script
engines are coupled to run in sync which enables checking for information leaks.
In spirit, this is similar to n-variant systems [9, 14] and multi-execution based
approaches [10,17,20]. However, our approach is more fine-grained since it checks
and synchronizes the processed data on the bytecode level of the script context
and is capable of detecting the actual information leak, instead of merely de-
tecting an artifact of a successful compromise (i.e., divergence in the control
flow).
8 Gawlik, Koppe, Kollenda, Pawlowski, Garmany and Holz
Fig. 1: Overview of our main information leak detection concept: The master process is
synchronized with a re-randomized, but otherwise identical twin process. If a memory
disclosure attack is conducted in the master, it appears as well in the twin. Due to the
different randomization, the disclosure attack manifests itself in different data flowing
into the script context and can be detected (0x727841F0 vs. 0x86941F0)
3.2 Per Process Re-randomization
To overcome the dilemma of modules having equal base addresses in different
processes, we collect all base addresses of modules a process loads during its
runtime. We refer to this first process, which is launched, as master process. A
second process instance of the application known as the twin process is spawned.
Upon its initialization, the base addresses gained from the master are occupied
in the virtual address space of the twin. This forces the image loader to map
the modules to other addresses than in the master process, as they are already
allocated. We save us the time and trouble to re-randomize the stack and heap
process-wise, as modern operating systems (e.g., Windows 8 on 64-bit) support
it natively. Finally, we establish an inter-process communication (IPC) bridge
between the master and twin process. This enables synchronized execution be-
tween them and comparison of data flows into their script contexts.
3.3 Dual Process Synchronization
After the re-randomization phase, both processes are ready to start execution
at their identical entrypoints. After exchanging a handshake, both resume exe-
cution. In order to achieve comparable data for information leak checking, the
executions of script interpreters in both processes have to be synchronized pre-
cisely. This is accomplished by intercepting an interpreter’s native methods.
Additionally, we install hooks inside the bytecode interpreter loop at positions
where opcodes are interpreted and corresponding native functions are called.
Thus, we perceive any high-level script method call at its binary level. The mas-
ter drives execution and these hooks are the points where the master and twin
process are synchronized via IPC. We check for information leaks by comparing
binary data which returns as high-level data into the script context. All input
data the master loads are stored in a cache and replayed to the twin process
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to ensure they operate on the same source (e.g., web pages a browser loads).
Built-in script functions that potentially introduce entropy (e.g., Math.random,
Date.now, and window.screenX in JavaScript) interfere with our deployed de-
tection mechanism, since they generate values inside the script context that are
different from each other in the master and twin processes, respectively. Addi-
tionally, they may induce a divergent script control flow. Both occurrences would
be falsely detected as memory disclosure. Thus we also synchronize the entropy
of both processes by copying the generated value from the master to the twin
process. This way the twin process continues working on the same data as the
master process and we are creating a co-deterministic script execution.
4 Implementation Details
Based on the concepts of per process re-randomization and dual process execu-
tion, we implemented a tool called Detile for Windows 8.0 and 8.1 64-bit. The
current prototype is able to re-randomize on a per process basis and instrument
Internet Explorer 10 and 11 to run in dual process execution mode.
4.1 Duplication and Re-randomization
In order to re-randomize processes and load images at different base addresses,
we developed a duplicator which creates a program’s master process. It enu-
merates the master’s initial loaded images with the help of the Windows API
(CreateToolHelp32Snapshot) before the master starts execution. Then, the
twin process is created in suspended mode, and a page is allocated in the twin
at all addresses of previously gathered image bases. We then need to trick the
Windows loader into mapping kernel32.dll at a different base in the twin.
This is achieved by leveraging the DebugAPI and via manipulating parameters
at calls of RtlEqualUnicodeString in the 32-bit loader in the ntdll.dll. This
way, the loader believes that a different DLL than kernel32.dll is going to be
initialized and allows the mapping to a different base. It is the first DLL which
is loaded after the WOW64 subsystem. Thus, all subsequent libraries that are
loaded and import functions from kernel32.dll have no problems to resolve
their dependencies using the remapped kernel32.dll. The loader maps them
to different addresses, as their preferred base addresses are reserved. Although
the DebugAPI is used, all steps run in a fully automated way. As a next step, the
DebugAPI is detached and the main image is remapped to a different address.
As it is already mapped even in suspended processes, this has to be done specifi-
cally. Additionally, LdrLoadDll in the twin process is detoured to intercept new
library loads and map incoming images to different addresses than in the master.
Technical details about our remapping can be found in the technical report [25].
We were not able to re-randomize ntdll.dll because it is mapped into the
virtual address space very early in the process creation procedure. Attempts to
remap ntdll.dll later on did not succeed due to callbacks invoked by the kernel.
The implications of a non re-randomized ntdll.dll are discussed in Section 7.
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Fig. 2: Detile running with Internet Explorer. A 64-bit duplicator library is injected
into the main IE frame process to enable it creating and rerandomizing twin tab pro-
cesses for each master tab process, by itself. The main IE frame also injects a 32-bit
DLL into each tab process to allow synchronization, communication between master
and twin, and information leak detection.
Note that this design works also with pure 64-bit processes. However, fre-
quently attacked applications like tab processes of Internet Explorer are 32-bit
and are running in the WOW64 subsystem. Hence, our framework has to protect
them as well. The following explains how Detile achieves this support.
While the above explained logic is sufficient to duplicate and re-randomize
a single-process program, additional measures have to be taken in the case of
multi-process architecture applications like Internet Explorer. Therefore, we de-
veloped a wrapper which starts the 64-bit main IE frame process and injects a
64-bit library, which we named duplicator library (see Figure 2). This way, we
modify the frame process, such that each time a tab process is started by the
frame process, a second tab process is spawned. The first becomes the master,
the second the twin. This is achieved via detouring and modifying the process
creation of the IE frame. Additionally, our above explained re-randomization
logic is incorporated into the duplicator library to allow the main IE frame pro-
cess itself to re-randomize its spawned twins at creation time. To protect each
new tab which is run by the IE frame, we ensure that each tab is run in a new
process and gets a twin. To enable communication, synchronization, and detec-
tion of information leaks, the duplicator injects also a 32-bit library into the
master and the twin upon their creation by the main IE frame process.
4.2 Synchronization
We designed our prototype to be contained in a DLL which is loaded into both
target instances. To reliably intercept all script execution, we hook LdrLoadDll
to initialize our synchronization as early as possible once the engine has been
loaded. After determining the role (master or twin), the processes exchange a
short handshake and wait for events from the interpreter instrumentation. While
most of our work is focused on the scripting engine, we also instrument parts of
wininet.dll to provide basic proxy functionality. The twin receives an exact
copy of the web data sent to the master to ensure the same code is executed.
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Entropy Normalization. The synchronization of script execution relies heavily
on the identification of functions and objects introducing entropy into the script
context. Values classified as entropy are overwritten in the twin with the value
received from the master. This ensures that functions such as Math.random and
Date.now return the exact same value, which is crucial for synchronous execu-
tion. While it is obvious for Date.now, it is not immediately clear for other meth-
ods. Therefore, entropy inducing methods are detected and filtered incremetally
during runtime. Hence, if a detection has triggered but the cause was not an
information leak, it is included into the list of entropy methods.
Rendezvous and Checking Points. Vital program points where master and twin
are synchronized are bytecode handler functions. If a handler function returns
data into the script context, it is first determined if the handler function is an en-
tropy inducing function. However, the vast majority of function invocations and
object accesses do not introduce entropy and are checked for equality between
master and twin on the fly. If a difference is encountered that is not classified as
entropy, we assume that an information leak occurred and take actions, namely
logging the incident and terminating both processes.
4.3 Chakra Instrumentation
The Chakra JavaScript Engine contains a JIT compiler. It runs in a dedicated
thread, identifies frequently executed (so called hot) functions and compiles them
to native code. Our current implementation works on script interpreters, hence
we disabled the JIT compiler. This is currently a prototype limitation whose
solution we discuss in Section 7.
In order to synchronize execution and check for information leaks, we in-
strumented the main loop of the Chakra interpreter, which is located in the
Js::InterpreterStackFrame::Process function. It is invoked recursively for
each JavaScript call and iterates over the variable length bytecodes of the Java-
Script function. The main loop contains a switch statement, which selects the
corresponding handler for the currently interpreted bytecode. The handler then
operates on the JavaScript context dependent on the operands and the current
state. In the examined Chakra versions, we observed up to 648 unique bytecodes.
Prior to the invocation of a bytecode handler, our instrumentation transfers the
control flow to a small, highly optimized assembly stub, which decides whether
the current bytecode is vital for our framework to handle.
We intercept all call and return as well as necessary conversion bytecodes
in order to extract metadata such as JavaScript function arguments, return val-
ues, and conversion values. Conversion bytecodes handle dynamic type casting,
native value to JavaScript object and JavaScript object to native value conver-
sions. Additionally, we intercept engine functions that handle implicit type casts
at native level, because they are invoked by other bytecode handlers as required
and have no bytecode equivalents themselves. Furthermore, all interception sites
support the manipulation of the outgoing native value or JavaScript object for
the purpose of entropy elimination in the JavaScript context of the twin process.
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4.4 AVM Instrumentation
Instrumentation of the AVM is based on prior work of F-Secure [28] and Mi-
crosoft [34]. We hook at the end of the native method verifyOnCall inside
verifyEnterGPR to intercept ActionScript method calls and retrieve Action-
Script method names. At these points, master and twin can be synchronized.
Parameters flowing into an ActionScript method and return data flowing back
into the ActionScript context can be dissected, too. They are also processed in-
side the method verifyEnterGPR. Based on their high level ActionScript types,
the parameters and return data can be compared in the master and twin. This
way, we can keep the master and twin in sync at method calls, check for infor-
mation leaks and mediate entropy data from the master to the twin.
5 Evaluation
In the following, we present evaluation results for our prototype implementation
of Detile in the form of performance and memory usage benchmarks. The
benchmarks were conducted on a system running Windows 8.0/8.1 that was
equipped with a 4th generation Intel i7-4710MQ quad-core CPU and 8GB DDR3
RAM. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our prototype can successfully detect
several kinds of real-world information leaks.
5.1 Re-randomization of Process Modules
We evaluated our re-randomization engine according to its effectiveness, memory
usage, and performance.
Effectiveness. We applied re-randomization to internal Windows applications
and third-party applications, to verify that modules in the twin are based at
different addresses than in the master. We therefore compared base addresses of
all loaded images between the two processes and confirmed that all images in the
twin process had a different base address than in the master, except ntdll.dll.
See the discussion in Section 7 for details on the difficulties of remapping the 64-
bit and 32-bit NT Layer DLLs. The extended version of this paper lists important
Windows DLLs, re-randomized in different processes running simultaneously on
a single user session [25].
Physical Memory Usage. To inspect the memory overhead of our re-random-
ization scheme, we measured the working set characteristics for different mas-
ter and re-randomized twin processes compared to native processes. Figure 3
shows the memory working sets of three applications. ReASLR denotes thereby
the re-randomization within a single process. DE means that two processes are
running, whereby the master’s randomization is kept native while the twin is
re-randomized. The applications besides IE are only included to measure the
memory overhead and are not synchronized. We calculate the memory overhead
of per process re-randomization (ReASLR) of a single process as follows:
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Fig. 3:Memory overhead of re-randomization and dual execution measured via working
set (WS) consumption in megabytes (M): Native processes on Windows 8.0 and 8.1
are contrasted to their counterparts running in re-randomized dual execution mode
(master and twin).
Overhead(ReASLR) =
WS(Twin)
WS(Native)
− 1
Thus, the overall memory overhead based on working sets is 0.46 times. When
running a program or process in per process re-randomization and dual process
execution (DE ), we have to include both master and twin into the memory
overhead calculation. Therefore, the overhead is calculated by
Overhead(ReASLR+DE) =
WS(Twin) +WS(Master)
WS(Native)
− 1
Its overall value is 1.45 times. Note that memory working sets can highly
vary during an application’s runtime, and thus, are difficult to quantify. The
measurements shown in Figure 3 were performed after the application has fin-
ished startup, and was waiting for user input (i.e., it was idle and all modules
were loaded and initialized). Due to additional twins for master processes, the
overall additional memory is about one to two times per protected process. The
technical report provides more details on the working set characteristics [25].
Re-randomization and Startup Time. When a program is started the first time
after a reboot, the kernel needs to create section objects for image modules.
Hence, the first start of a program always takes longer than subsequent starts of
the same program. To measure the additional startup and module load times our
protection introduces, we first run each program natively once to allow the kernel
to create section objects of most natively used DLLs, and close it afterwards.
We then start the program natively without protection and measure the time
until it is idle and all of its initial modules are loaded. In the same way, we
measure the time from process creation until both the master and twin process
have their inital modules loaded. The startup comparison can be seen in Table 2.
As expected, the startup times of applications protected with our approach are
approximately doubled. This is caused by the fact that a twin process needs to
be spawned for each master that should be protected.
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Table 2: Startup times in seconds and startup slowdowns of native 32-bit applications
compared to their counterparts running with per process re-randomization and dual
process execution on Windows 8.0 and Windows 8.1 (both 64-bit).
Native (8.0) ReASLR+DE (8.0) Slowdown Native (8.1) ReASLR+DE (8.1) Slowdown
IE tab spawn 0.9163 s 2.0710 s 1.3x 0.5194 s 1.3082 s 1.5x
Firefox 0.9624 s 1.8064 s 0.9x 1.3823 s 1.5441 s 0.1x
Calculator 0.3484 s 0.3610 s 0.0x 0.4391 s 0.6599 s 0.5x
Table 3: Native script execution of IE 11 on Windows 8.1 64-bit compared to the
script execution of IE 11 instrumented with Detile. Execution time is measured in
milliseconds using the internal F12 developer tools provided by IE.
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5.2 Detection Engine
Next, we evaluate the impact of Detile on the user experience and its effec-
tiveness in detecting information leaks.
Script Execution Time and Responsiveness. We used the 15 most visited web-
sites worldwide [2] to test how the current prototype interferes with the normal
usage of these pages. Besides the subjective impression while using the page,
we utilized the F12 developer tools of Internet Explorer 11 to measure script-
ing execution time provided by the UI Responsiveness profiler tab. These tests
were performed using Windows 8.1 64-bit and Internet Explorer 11. While we
introduce a performance hit of around 17.0% on average, the subjective user ex-
perience was not noticeably affected. This is due to IE’s deferred parsing, which
results in displaying content to the user before all computations have finished.
Information Leak Detection. We tested our approach on a pure memory dis-
closure vulnerability (CVE-2014-6355) which allows illegitimately reading data
due to a JPEG parsing flaw in Microsoft’s Windows graphics component [61].
It can be used to defeat ASLR by reading leaked stack information back to
the attacker via the toDataURL method of a canvas object. We successfully de-
tected this leak at the point of the call to toDataURL in the master and twin
process. In the same way, detection was successful for an exploit for a similar
bug (CVE-2015-0061 [62]).
To further verify our prototype, we evaluated it against an exploit for CVE-
2011-1346, a vulnerability that was used in the pwn2own contest 2011 to bypass
ASLR [63]. As this memory disclosure bug is specific for IE 8, we ported the vul-
nerability into IE 11. An uninitialized index attribute of a new HTML option
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element is used to leak information. Similarly, we successfully detected this ex-
ploitation attempt when the index attribute was accessed.
Additionally, we tested our prototype on another real-world vulnerability
(CVE-2014-0322) that was used in targeted attacks [22]. It is a use-after-free
error that can be utilized to increase an arbitrary bit, which is enough to create
information leaks. Detile triggered as a Vtable pointer was returned into the
JavaScript context. Therefore, the information leak was detected successfully.
We also constructed a toy example in which our native code creates an infor-
mation leak by overwriting the length field of an array. Additionally, the image
base of jscript9.dll is written after the array data. In our tests, we reliably
detected the out-of-bounds read of the image base and stopped the execution of
the process. Exploit details are provided in the technical report [25].
False Positive Analysis. We analyzed the 100 top websites worldwide [2] to
evaluate if our prototype can precisely handle real-world, complex websites and
their JavaScript contexts without triggering false alarms. None of the tested
websites did generate an alert, indicating that the prototype can accurately
synchronize the master and twin process.
6 Related Work
In the following, we review work closely related to ours and discuss differences
to our approach.
Randomization Techniques. Several approaches have been proposed to either
improve address space layout randomization, randomize the data space, or ran-
domize on single instruction level. For example, binary stirring [56] re-randomizes
code pages at a high rate for a high performance cost. While it hinders attack-
ers to use information leaks in code-reuse attacks, it does not impede their
creation by itself. In contrast, our re-randomization scheme reuses the native
operating system loader and is the base to allow information leak detection with
dual process execution. Other solutions [32, 40, 40] are prone to JIT-ROP code-
reuse attacks [48], which are based on information leaks. Address space layout
permutation is an approach to scramble all data and functions of a binary [32].
Therefore, a given ELF binary has to be rewritten and randomization can be ap-
plied on each run. ORP [40] rewrites instructions of a given binary and reorders
basic blocks. As discussed above, it is prone to information leak attacks, which
we detect. Instruction set randomization [5, 31] complicates code-reuse attacks
as it encrypts code pages and decrypts it on the fly. However, in the presence of
information leaks combined with key guessing [48,50,57] it can be circumvented.
Instruction layout randomization (ILR) [29] randomizes the location of each in-
struction on each run, but no re-randomization occurs. Thus, the layout can be
reconstructed with the help of an information leak. Readactor is a defensive sys-
tem that aims to be resilient against just-in-time code-reuse attacks [15]. It hides
code pointers behind execute-only trampolines and code itself is made execute-
only, to prevent an attacker building a code-reuse payload just-in-time. However,
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it has been shown that it is vulnerable against an attack named COOP, which
reuses virtual functions [44]. Unlike Readactor, Detile prevents COOP, as this
attack needs an information leak as first step. Crane et al. recently presented
an enhanced version of Readactor, dubbed Readactor++ [16], that also protects
against whole function reuse attacks such as COOP. This is achieved through
function pointer table randomization and insertion of booby traps. Consequently,
an adversary can no longer obtain meaningful code locations that can be lever-
aged for code-reuse attacks. Readactor++ also does not detect or prevent the
exploitation of memory disclosures, which poses a potential attack vector.
Multi-Execution Approaches. Most closely related to our research are n-variant
systems, which run variants of the same program with diverse memory layout
and instructions [14]. Similar work runs program replicæ synchronized at system
calls to demonstrate the detection of memory exploits against the lightweight
server thttpd on the Linux platform [9, 30].
The major drawback of theses systems is the detection approach: if a mem-
ory error is abused, one of the variants eventually crashes, which indicates an
attack. As information leaks do not constitute a memory error, they do not raise
any exception-based signal. Thus, they remain undetected in these systems. One
significant implication is that unlike Detile, n-variant systems do not protect
against just-in-time code-reuse attacks such as JIT-ROP [48]. Similarily, this is
the case with COOP attacks in browsers [44]. N-variant systems prevent con-
ventional ROP attacks [42,54] with multi process execution and disjunct virtual
address spaces: An attacker supplied absolute address (e.g., obtained through
a remote memory disclosure vulnerability) is guaranteed to be invalid in n − 1
replicas. Hence, any system call utilizing this address will trigger a detection.
However, JIT-ROP attacks may performs several memory disclosures and ma-
licious computations without executing a system call inbetween, and thus, can
evade traditional n-variant systems. COOP attacks may as well perform touring-
complete computations on disclosed memory without executing a system call and
evade these systems.
7 Discussion
In the following, we discuss potential shortcomings of our approach and the
prototype, and also sketch how these shortcomings can be addressed in the
future.
Further Information Leaks. Serna provided an in-depth overview of techniques
that utilize information leaks for exploit development [47]. The techniques he
discussed during the presentation utilize JavaScript code. As our prototype lever-
ages the JavaScript engine of the browser itself, each information leak that is
based on these techniques is detected. This implies that memory disclosure at-
tacks that leverage other (scripting) contexts (e.g., VBScript) can potentially
bypass our implementation. However, in practice exploits are typically triggered
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via JavaScript and thus our prototype can detect such attacks. Furthermore, due
to the generic nature of our approach, our current prototype can be extended
by instrumenting other scripting engines as well.
Prototype Limitations. In the unlikely event one of the functions we classified as
entropy source, such as Math.random or Date.now, contain a memory disclosure
bug, our approach can lead to an under-approximation of detected information
leaks. In this specific case, the master confuses the leaked pointer with data
from the entropy source and transfers it to the twin process. This is an unde-
sirable state, because Detile does not prevent the memory layout information
to leak into the script context. However, the obtained pointer is only valid in
the master process. An attempt to leverage the pointer to mount a code-reuse
attack crashes the twin. As a consequence, Detile halts the master process and
prevents further damage.
The current prototype disables the JIT Engine as we protect the interpreter
only. However, dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI [8, 35]) frameworks allow
to synchronize processes on the intruction or basic block level, and hence, make
it possible to hook emitted JIT code to dispatch our assembly stub in order to
synchronize and check within the JIT code.
Asynchronious JavaScript events are currently not synchronized. This is solv-
able with DBI frameworks as well: If an event triggers in the master process, we
let the twin execute to the same point. Then Detile sets up and triggers the
same event in the twin process.
One additional shortcoming of our prototype implementation is the identical
mapping of ntdll.dll in all processes. As this DLL is initialized already at
startup, remapping it is a cumbersome operation. JavaScript, HTML, and other
contexts in browsers normally do not interact directly with native ntdll.dll
Windows structures, and thus internal JavaScript objects, do not contain direct
memory references to it. Hence, attackers resort to disclose addresses from li-
braries other than ntdll.dll at first. On the contrary, there might be script
engines which directly interact with ntdll.dll. Still, the issue is probably solv-
able with a driver loaded during boot time.
Another technical drawback is the application of re-randomization on every
process on the OS, as DLL modules of each process would turn into non-shareable
memory and increase physical memory consumption. This can be avoided by
protecting only critical processes that represent a valid target for attacks.
Deployment. The current prototype is not meant to be a protection framework
for end users of web browsers. It is intended to be deployed as a system for
scanning web pages to discover unknown exploits which utilize information leaks.
As ASLR needs to be circumvented as a first step of each modern exploit against
web browsers, Detile has the advantage to provide an early detection of the
exploit process.
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8 Conclusion
Over the last years, script engines were used to exploit vulnerable applications.
Especially web browsers became an attractive target for a plethora of attacks.
State-of-the-art vulnerability exploits, both in academic research [11,18,26,27,45]
and in-the-wild [46, 55, 58–60], rely on memory disclosure attacks.
In this work, we proposed a fine-grained, automated scheme to reliably detect
such information leaks in script engines. It is based on the insight that informa-
tion leaks result in a noticable difference in the script context of two synchronized
processes with different randomization. We implemented a prototype of this idea
for the proprietary browser IE to demonstrate that our approach is viable even
on closed-source systems. An empirical evaluation demonstrates that we can re-
liably detect real-world attack vectors and that the approach induces a moderate
performance overhead only (around 17% overhead on average). While most re-
search focused on mitigating specific types of vulnerabilities, we address the root
cause behind modern attacks since most of them rely on information leaks as
a first step. Our approach thus serves as another defense layer to complement
defenses such as DEP and ASLR.
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